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A. Davesne – The Laval Case and the Future of Labour Relations in Sweden 
 
Abstract: 
Together with a series of related ECJ cases (Viking, Rüffert), the Laval case became famous 
as a new display of the struggle between economic freedoms and social rights in the EU. But 
the European controversy is only one part of the story. Focusing on the Laval case, this 
article goes back to the place where it all started – Sweden – and tries to shed light on the 
missing link between the European controversy over posted workers and the challenges that 
the Swedish labour model is currently facing. The Swedish labour relations system has now 
to cope with legal uncertainty while the government, the employers and the Trade Unions are 
increasingly struggling over labour regulation. Beyond its juridical aspects, the Laval case is 
thus a landmark political event, as it unveils and increases the turmoil of the Swedish 
autonomous labour relations. It thus displays a new opportunity for reforming industrial 
relations and labour regulations in Sweden, in a time when they are as much pressured at 
home as they are admired abroad. 
 
Résumé: 
L’affaire Laval, liée à une série d’affaires de la CJCE (Viking, Rüffert), a été rendue célèbre à 
travers l’Europe comme étant un nouvel avatar des contradictions entre libertés 
économiques et droits sociaux. Mais la dimension européenne n’est qu’une partie de la 
controverse et cet article met en lumière les liens entre d’une part les débats européens sur 
les travailleurs détachés et d’autre part les enjeux qu’affronte le modèle suédois de relations 
industrielles. Au-delà de ses aspects juridiques, l’affaire Laval est un évènement politique 
majeur en Suède, puisqu’elle met en exergue et accentue les difficultés du système 
autonome de régulation du marché du travail par les partenaires sociaux. Elle offre en effet 
de nouvelles opportunités pour réformer les relations industrielles et les règlementations 
salariales, elles-mêmes qui sont autant menacées en Suède qu’admirées à l’étranger. 
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THE LAVAL CASE AND THE FUTURE OF LABOUR RELATIONS IN SWEDEN1 
 
 
In the end of 2004, Swedish Unions implemented a collective action against the Latvian 
construction company Laval because it temporarily posted Latvian workers to Sweden 
without signing any local collective agreement, setting up among others the wage level. Laval 
sued the Trade Unions for discrimination against foreign workers. The Swedish labour Court 
then referred the case to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which ruled that the blockade 
was disproportionately infringing the Community provisions for free movement of workers – 
even though the fight against social dumping “may constitute an overriding reason of public 
interest2”. The Court stressed that one cannot impose an obligation on foreign service 
providers to respect any working standards which would go beyond the minimum standards 
set by the Posting of Workers Directive (PWD3). The collective action was thus deemed 
illegal, since Sweden does not have any legislation on a national minimum wage.  
 
While the Laval case has strongly contributed to the heated debate over the future of a 
“social Europe”, it seems useful to cast a first glance at its impacts on the Swedish labour 
relations and collective agreement system. Even though the domestic consequences of this 
decision are still unsettled, we argue that the Laval case has already impacted the Swedish 
labour relations – mainly by affecting the strategic environment of domestic actors. Building 
upon Europeanization studies, our research design follows a “bottom-up” pattern, as it 
checks how EC treaty rules and the interpretations that the ECJ makes of it change the 
opportunity structures for labour market reforms at domestic level (Olsen, 2002). This paper 
puts forward the agenda-setting dimension of European integration and relies upon the 
assumption that this process does not prevent national institutions or actors from making 
creative usages of the European changes (including the possibility to accommodate or avoid 
them; Jacquot and Woll, 2003). Indeed, a number of social scientists already pointed out the 
fact that actors can adapt domestic policies and produce change rather independently from 
pressures arising from institutional misfit. As underlined by Mark Thatcher, “some actors may 
well already be seeking reform (…). Thus, from an actor perspective, EU requirements may 
not be a ‘pressure’ but rather an opportunity” (Thatcher, 2004).  
 
Referring to the Laval case, we argue that the European integration brings about legal 
pressures and political opportunities to reframe the power-balance between social partners 
and to review national labour regulations. The first part of the paper will be devoted to the 
Laval case itself and the controversies it triggered in Europe (1). In order to better 
understand what is at stake for the future of the Swedish labour model, we will then 
investigate the domestic background of Laval case (2) and the opportunities for reform that 
the judgement created in this particular context (3). 
                                                 
1 The present paper derives from a presentation “Is the Swedish Labour Model Challenged by the Laval Case? A 
National Controversy in the Context of Europeanized Labour Markets” during the 2008 Oxford/Sciences-Po 
Doctoral Seminar on Regional and Global Institutions in the 21st Century (01/05/2008). I would like to thank 
Sophie Jacquot, Renaud Dehousse, Zaki Laïdi, Andrew Hurrell, Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Alex Betts and my Phd 
colleagues for their comments. 
2 European Court of Justice, Judgment in Case C-341/05(Grand Chamber), Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 18 December 2007 
3 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting 
of workers in the framework of the provision of Services 
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1. THE APPLICATION OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS TO POSTED WORKERS AND THE FIGHT 
AGAINST “SOCIAL DUMPING” WITHIN THE EU 
 
According to the “law on workers' participation in decisions” (MBL4), Sweden displays a 
peculiar system of industrial relations which mainly relies on collective agreements 
(kollektivavtalssystemet5). Collective agreements belong to the field of private law, 
“somewhere between law and contracts” (Olsson, 2007). The overall pattern of the Swedish 
labour model dates back from the Sältsjöbaden agreement which paved the way in 1938 for 
tripartite industrial relations featuring strong and consensus-oriented social partners. Beside 
a strong commitment to a comprehensive and costly Welfare State, this system of industrial 
relations allowed the pursuit of a solidaristic wage policy together with a low-inflatory and 
productivist industrial policy (according to the Rehn-Meidner model, solidaristic wage policies 
move manpower from “sunset” to “sunrise” jobs; Gould, 2001). Fritz Scharpf notes that the 
system instituted by the “peace agreement” of Sältsjöbaden allowed Sweden to score 
highest on average wage level and equalization, with a comparatively low level of labour 
conflicts (Scharpf, 1991). 
This well-known labour market model has evolved long before Sweden’s membership to the 
EU. The central bargaining system broke down in the 1980s and social negotiations between 
the Unions and the employers are since then giving birth to sector and firm-based 
agreements on working conditions and wages (Jochem, 2000). Despite these major 
changes, the State authorities stick to a careful “hands off” policy, leaving labour market 
regulation to social partners and thus avoiding any comprehensive national legislation about 
minimum wage. The lowest wages are called ingångslön or grundlön (entry-wage or basic-
wage). They are set up at local level and may vary from one industry to the other6. In fact, 
“entry-wages” are often directed to inexperienced workers and they are nothing more than a 
virtual starting point for further negotiations. There is nothing like a minimum wage in 
Sweden, there are only negotiated ones. Branch-wide and firm-based collective agreements 
covered about 90% of all the workers in 2007 and the right to take industrial actions is a 
central feature of this system7. Indeed, the wage level depends on negotiations and on 
legitimate measures of industrial action such as boycotts if negotiations break down (Merghi, 
2006). This specific institutional nexus is only partly shared with Denmark and creates a 
specific “autonomous collective agreements model”, as Ahlberg, Bruun and Malmberg call it 
(Ahlberg et al., 2006). The Laval case challenged precisely the compatibility of those 
arrangements with EC law in the context of cross-border labour mobility.   
 
 
A brief presentation of the Laval case8 
 
The Latvian building company Laval un Partneri Ltd (‘Laval’) was appointed on the 27th of 
May 2004 by the city of Vaxholm, a small town in the outskirts of Sweden’s capital city 
Stockholm, in order to refurbish an old school building. The work was actually undertaken by 
a subsidiary company Baltic Bygg AB which hired Latvian posted workers appointed by 
Laval’s head office. In June 2004, Laval/Baltic Bygg and the Swedish Building Workers’ 
Union, (Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, ‘Byggnads9’) initiated negotiations in order to 
                                                 
4 Lag om Medbestämmande i arbetslivet, MBL (1976:580) 
5 Collective agreements are set up by the article 23 of the MBL 
6 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/SWEDEN/ANCHOR-MINIMIL-Ouml-N-SE.htm 
7 SOU 2008:123 
8 Case C-341/05 
9 ‘Byggnads’ belong to the major Swedish blue collar Union, Landsorganisationen Sverige, ‘LO’. Its local branch is 
named Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet avdelning 1, ‘Byggettan’ 
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conclude an “application agreement” (hängavtal10) to the collective convention for the 
building sector. A number of meetings occurred between Byggnads and the representative 
for Baltic/Laval until contacts eventually collapsed on the 15th of September 200411. As usual, 
wage negotiations were the most controversial item of the negotiation. No agreement could 
be reached, as Laval wanted to fix pay terms at SEK 109 per hour (on the basis of the legal 
entry-wage mentioned above), whereas Byggnads demanded at least SEK 145, a level 
which was said to be in line with the average wage level in the Stockholm region for building 
undertakings (based on publicly available quarterly statistics; Gerhardsson, 2006).  
Usually, Swedish labour relations provide that the existing branch convention has to be 
signed first, laying down the basic requirements concerning unemployment insurance, safety 
at work, working hours and other legal conventions12. Wage negotiations must take place at 
a local level, only once the parties agreed upon the branch convention. During this phase, 
the Unions are bound to a ‘social peace’ clause (fredsplikt) and cannot take any collective 
action against the employer13. Yet, the negotiations between Laval and Byggnads were 
plagued by mutual distrust and Laval refused to sign a collective agreement without any 
preliminary agreement on wage level. Laval obtained these negotiations to be performed 
jointly and simultaneously. This explains why collective negotiations usually do not end up in 
such a deadlock as they did in Vaxholm. 
When the negotiations collapsed altogether mainly because of the wage issue, Laval entered 
into an alternative collective agreement with the Latvian Trade Union of Construction 
Workers, to which 65% of the posted workers were affiliated. According to the Swedish 
legislation, the Swedish Union denied the relevance of a Latvian collective agreement, as the 
work has to be performed in Sweden. As Laval refused to sign a collective agreement with 
Byggnads, the Union implemented industrial actions on the 2nd of November 2004, blocking 
the access to the building site and depriving it from all supplies. The electricians Trade Union 
(Elektrikerförbundet) participated to sympathy actions, helping Byggnads to blockade the 
site. A proceeding was then brought by Laval to the Swedish labour Court (Arbetsdomstolen) 
on the 7th of December to obtain, first, a declaration that the collective action blockading 
Laval’s worksites is unlawful, second, an order that such action should cease, and, third, an 
order that the Trade Unions pay compensation for the loss suffered by Laval. The Swedish 
Arbetsdomstolen referred the case to the European Court of Justice on the 15th of 
September 200514. A few weeks before, Laval’s Swedish affiliated company was declared 
bankrupt and the posted workers returned to Latvia. The building of the school was later 
taken on by a Swedish company who signed the collective agreement and paid the workers 
about SEK 160 per hour. 
The Laval case raised in the first place a prejudicial question about the right of Unions to take 
industrial actions against a foreign employer in order to get him to sign a local collective 
agreement, in the context of EU rules on freedom of movement to provide services15. 
Byggnads argued that the question asked to the Court is not relevant because it neglects the 
principle of subsidiarity by implying that EC law can restrict the application of collective 
                                                 
10 “Hängavtal” refers to the type of collective agreement signed with employers who are not members of the 
Swedish employers' federation. They are a way for Trade Union to fight social dumping by applying to non-
affiliated companies the same conditions to those applying to the whole branch. 
11 „Osakert om om facket har rätten på sin sida”, Dagens Nyheter, 02-12-2004 
12 In the present case, the building branch convention has been signed by Byggnads and by the employers’ 
organisation, Sveriges Byggindustrier 
13 Article 41 MBL 
14 AD aktbilaga nr. 133 i mål nr. A 268/04 ; AD 2005 No 49 
15 The questions to the ECJ reads: “1. Is it compatible with rules of the EC Treaty on the freedom to provide 
services [Article 49] and the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of nationality [Article 12] and with the 
provisions of Directive 96/71/ECof the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning 
the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services for trade unions to attempt, by means of 
industrial action in the form of a blockade, to force a foreign temporary provider of services in the host country to 
sign a collective agreement in respect of terms and conditions of employment such as that set out in the above-
mentioned decision of the Arbetsdomstolen, if the situation in the host country is such that the legislation intended 
to implement Directive 96/71 has no express provisions concerning the application of terms and conditions of 
employment in collective agreements?” 
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agreements applying to posted workers in a Member State. The Court rejected this argument 
and ruled the case on the legal basis of the articles 12 and 49 EC, laying down the 
community law on discrimination and the freedom to provide services, as well as the 
Directive 96/71/EC specifically concerning the posting of workers in the EU. The Posting of 
Workers directive (PWD) compels foreign service-providers to comply to a nucleus of 
mandatory rules, that is “minimum standards laid down by host Members State’s law, 
regulation or administrative action, and/or by collective agreements which have been 
declared universally applicable”16. The bottom line of the judgement is that the Swedish 
system does not fit to this legal framework, and thereby does not provide clear and 
predictable rules for foreign providers. 
The Directive 96/71/EC was transposed into Swedish law by the act on posted workers 
passed by the Riksdag on the 9th of December 199917. All items referring to the terms and 
conditions of employment listed by the PWD thus apply in Sweden, save for the minimum 
pay rates which continue to be determined by collective agreements (Merghi, 2006). This 
way to set up wages is not infringing the Directive, as long as it displays non discriminatory 
rules. Yet, the Court pointed out that Sweden does not have a legal or regulatory system 
allowing the collective agreements to be considered as automatically generally applicable 
(‘erga omnes’ effect). Therefore, as long as all the local companies are not bound to a 
collective agreement, Swedish Trade Unions cannot compel foreign employers to do so. 
Beside the absence of minimal wage and the lack of a general application of collective 
agreements, the Court noticed that several conditions included in the collective agreement 
proposed by Byggnads were not in line with the Directive on posted workers, such as the 
requirement for the employer to pay to Byggnads a fee amounting to 1.5% of the wages bill 
(Granskningsavgift) and to subscribe to an insurance (AFA försäkringar18; Ismal, 2007). The 
industrial action pursued by Byggnads against Laval was thus discriminatory with regard to 
EC treaty rules, given that Byggnads’ claims exceeded the minimal working conditions listed 
by the directive (§85). 
Having clearly stated that LO-Byggnads’ collective action against Laval did not fall outside of 
the scope of article 49 EC (§5119) and exceeded the minimum conditions led by the PWD, 
the ECJ then turned to a less limpid reasoning about the legality of the collective action with 
regard to EC free movement rules. The ambiguity of the judgment is striking: on the one 
hand, the Court recognizes the right to take collective action as a fundamental right (§95), 
but on the other hand it has to be proved proportionate and compatible with EC law. Any 
infringement to the freedom of movement must thus be justified by “overriding reasons of 
public interest” (§101 & 103). As regards LO-Byggnads’ industrial action, the Court considers 
that such action in the form of a blockade of sites constitutes a restriction on the freedom to 
provide services, which is disproportionate with regard to the public interest aim of protecting 
workers. 
The second part of the judgment concerns the compatibility between the EC law and the 
Swedish labour law which regulates more specifically the provisions for legal collective 
actions against foreign companies20. As mentioned above, the article 42 of the MBL prohibits 
                                                 
16 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting 
of workers in the framework of the provision of services, OJ 1997 L18/1 
The “core” of  minimum standards concerns a) working time; b) days off; c) minimum wage; d) working conditions; 
e) safety, security and health on the working place; f) protection for pregnant women and young people g) non-
discrimination 
17 Utstationeringslagen 1999:678 
18 The insurance-fee provided by the collective agreement amounts up to 5,66 % of the global wages bill 
19 The ECJ rejected its Albany argument which stated that collective actions fall outside the scope of the article 49 
EC, an argument which was put forward both by Trade unions and the Swedish government (§89), see also 
ZAHN, Rebecca, “The Viking and Laval Cases in the Context of European Enlargement”, 3 Web JCLI, 2008 and 
BARNARD, Catherine, “Employment rights, Free movement and the EC Treaty and the Service Directive”, in 
RÖNNMAR, M. (eds.), National Industrial relations vs EU industrial relations, Kluwer, 2008, forthcoming 
20 The question to the ECJ reads: “2. The Swedish Medbestämmandelagen (Law on workers' participation in 
decisions) prohibits industrial action taken with the intention of circumventing a collective agreement concluded by 
other parties. That prohibition applies, however, pursuant to a special provision contained in part of the law known 
as the lex Britannia, only where a trade union takes measures in respect of industrial relations to which the 
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the starting of a collecting action as soon as the social partners are bound by a collective 
agreement (the so called “social peace” clause). In order to limit to risk of social dumping 
after a national law case in 198921, an amendment was added 1991 by the Parliament, 
allowing Trade Unions to implement collective actions against a foreign employer who would 
not comply with a Swedish collective agreement because he is already bound by a less 
protective collective agreement at home22. According to the ECJ, this Lex Britannia 
amendment displays unfair competition between national and foreign companies too. 
The national Court will finally decide whether Laval is entitled to compensations due to unfair 
treatment23. Preliminary negotiations set up by the Labour Court in order to come up with an 
agreement on the amount of the compensations have not been successful yet, while LO is 
still opposing the idea of having to pay a fine to Laval24. 
 
 
Balancing economic freedoms and social rights in the EU25 
 
Before addressing the effects of the Laval case on the Swedish labour system, we must first 
account to the reasons why it has become, together with similar cases on the posting of 
workers26, one of the most controversial issues in recent European industrial and labour 
politics. 
Ten new Member States mainly belonging to the Central European area joined the EU on the 
1st of May 2004, with their wage levels and labour provisions being respectively lower and 
weaker than those applying in the 15 Member States27. This imbalance created concerns 
about the risk that the full appliance of EC treaty rules on free movement to the new Member 
States would lead to “social dumping”28. The Laval case was thus depicted by Trade Unions 
and Left parties as a warning against the dangers of a full-fledged European-wide labour 
market. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Medbestämmandelagen is directly applicable, which means in practice that the prohibition is not applicable to 
industrial action against a foreign undertaking which is temporarily active in Sweden and which brings its own 
workforce. Do the rules of the EC Treaty on the freedom to provide services and the prohibition on discrimination 
on grounds of nationality and the provisions of Directive 96/71 constitute an obstacle to an application of the latter 
rule — which, together with other parts of the lex Britannia also mean in practice that Swedish collective 
agreements become applicable and take precedence over foreign collective agreements already concluded — to 
industrial action in the form of a blockade taken by Swedish trade unions against a foreign temporary provider of 
services in Sweden?” 
21 Arbetsdomstolen, law case Lex Britannia, 1989, n°120: the prohibition of collective action  by the “social peace 
rule” applies to collective actions in Sweden affecting collective agreements passed outside Sweden 
22 Lag (1991:681) om ändring i lagen (1976:580) om medbestämmande i arbetslivet 
23 “Bakläxa för Sverige I EU:s domstol, Dagens Nyheter, 19-12-2007 
24 Secret negotiations have not been successful yet, Laval’s claim could amount to SEK 2,8 millions, and 2 
millions for the proceedings, ”Laval vill ha EU-domslut”, LO, 2008-09-17 
25 To rephrase quotations by Rebecca Zahn: “the delicate balancing between economic freedoms and social 
rights” or Norbert Reich, “Free Movement v. Social Rights in an Enlarged Union - the Laval and Viking Cases 
before the ECJ” 
26 The Laval case is not the only decision affecting the balance between the provisions for free movement of 
workers and national social protection in the past months. A similar case, Viking Line, was ruled on the 11th of 
December 200726, a couple of days before Laval. The Viking case deals with the posting of workers (here for a 
ferry-boat company) and the right for Trade Unions to take collective actions in order to prevent social dumping. 
The Viking line judgement is very much in line with the Laval case’s one, since the Court said that any collective 
action – although legitimate – must not preclude the fulfilment of article 43 EC which guarantees the free 
movement of workers. A more recent case, Rüffert, has been ruled in a similar direction on the 3rd of April 2008 by 
the ECJ. The German Land of Niedersaxen was convicted for displaying uneven conditions for competitive 
bidding, since local authorities asked foreign companies to comply with wage levels upon which social partner did 
not agree by a general available collective convention. 
27 The average wage level was about 11 and 25% lower in the new MS in 2004 – Medlingsinstitutets årsrapport, 
Avtalsrörelsen och lönebildningen 2004, p. 220 
28 Most of the older member States coped with this growing anxiety by setting temporary measures in order to 
only gradually open their markets to the potential flow of east-European workers. Sweden was in 2004 one of the 
few countries - together with Ireland and the UK - to restrain from setting temporary barriers against workers 
coming from new Member States 
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The Laval case added to the political confusion throughout Europe, as the judicial 
proceedings occurred while the highly controversial directive on services was being drafted29. 
The first draft of the services directive was strongly deregulatory, triggering massive protests 
from Unionists, MEPs and governments30. The main bone of contention was the 
establishment of “the country of origin principle”. This clause stated that a foreign provider 
coming from any EU State should have access to another Member States’ market according 
to its home country rules, which was seen as opening the doors to a “run to the bottom” of 
labour legislations. This proposal was withdrawn from the final version of the directive, 
following the amendments agreed upon by the European Parliament and the Council. The 
‘Bolkenstein’ draft initially amended the posted workers’ directive, but the final version clearly 
distinguished both directives31. The temporary posting of workers remains thus unaffected by 
the directive 2006/123 EC on services. Nevertheless, the challenges and issues posed by 
the ‘Bolkenstein’ directive are similar to the ones the ECJ dealt with in its Laval ruling. The 
judgement does not explicitly imply that the Latvian labour law should apply to the Latvian 
workers who are posted in Sweden, but the labour law expert Stéphane Rodrigues fears that 
the Court’s decision could “bring back [the country of origin principle] via the backdoor” by 
restricting the instances were the host Member State is allowed to regulate the posting of 
workers on its own territory32.  
Furthermore, the Laval case raises more general questions about the implementation of the 
EU legislations and its autonomy against primary EC law (i.e. treaties; Cavallini, 2007). The 
directive 96/71/EC on the posting of workers was indeed intended at protecting posted 
workers rights and enhancing host Member States’ labour legislation, but its scope is limited 
and its implementation appears to be uncertain. The Court’s judgement ruled that the scope 
of the directive cannot be extended beyond the set of minimum protection listed by the 
directive. If collective agreements exceed the list of minimum protection laid by the PWD, 
they have to pass the test of proportionality with regard to the fundamental freedoms and 
competition rules laid by the treaties. In this sense, the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC) argues that the directive does not actually provide a floor of protection that the host 
states must apply to the posted workers. It instead establishes a ceiling of employment 
conditions that the host states are allowed to extend to the posted workers33. Following the 
same line of thinking, EP Employment Committee’s rapporteur on “Challenges to collective 
agreements in the EU” Jan Andersson (PSE, SE) said he was worried that the minimum 
conditions set out in the posting of workers directive might become maximum conditions34. 
The ECJ has displayed a strong commitment to guaranteeing the right to implement 
collective action in Europe as a way to protect fundamental rights, a stance that was 
welcomed by ETUC and by the main European parties35. Yet, many EC law experts voiced 
concerns about the Court’s reference to proportionality requirements when it comes to 
implement collective actions (Bercusson, 2007). One can indeed wonder what does 
proportionality actually mean when dealing with contradictory fundamental rights such as free 
movement on the one hand and protecting workers rights on the other. Although ECJ judges 
indicate that fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights need to be ‘balanced’ against 
each other, there still seem to be a clear hierarchy between the former and the latter: those 
exercising a freedom of movement do not have to justify their actions, whereas collective 
bargaining and collective actions have to be proven justified and proportionate to the 
fundamental rights they aim at protecting. Catherine Barnard provides an interesting long 
                                                 
29 Directive 2006/123/EC, Also called ‘Bolkenstein’ after the name of former Internal Market Commissioner Frits 
Bolkenstein 
30 The Swedish social-democratic Labour Minister voiced his fear that the Swedish Model would be at risk against 
“social dumping”, quoted by Catherine Barnard, ibid. 
31 For a thorough investigation on the links between the posted workers cases and the service directive, see 
Catherine Barnard, ibid. 
32 Stéphane Rodrigues,  « Le retour de l’affaire Bolkenstein ? »,  www.Telos-eu.com,  09-01-2008 
33 “European social model challenged by Court rulings”, www.EurActiv.com, 27 February 2008 
34 26/02/2008 Members of the Employment Committee debated today with experts and representatives of trade 
unions and employers associations the European Court of Justice Rulings on the Laval and Viking cases. 
35 “Viking and Laval cases”, Explanatory Memorandum for Executive Committee of the ETUC, 4 March 2008 
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term analysis of the ECJ law case related to employment rights and free movement which 
helps us to understand this structural imbalance: “The real challenge to national regulatory 
autonomy came with the gradual adoption by the Court of the so-called ‘market access’ test” 
(Barnard, forth.). This principle goes beyond the fight against discriminatory rules and 
increases the ECJ scrutiny, as the Court checks if a national regulation is “liable to prohibit or 
otherwise impede the activities of a provider of services established in another Member State 
(…)”36. The same approach has been used by the Court in the Laval case (§99), marking a 
substantial hierarchy between economic and social rights. 
 
 
Securing collective agreements in the EU 
 
The ECJ judges knew about the stakes of this landmark decision on the balance between EC 
freedoms and national employment rights and the Court itself was certainly strongly divided 
on this ruling. The conclusions of the General Advocate37 and the ambiguity of the reasoning 
prove that the Grand Chamber came up with a tricky compromise38. Given the political 
turmoil around this case and the uncertainty regarding its long-term effects, one might thus 
expect a legislative response at EU level in order to secure national labour regulations and to 
bring politics back into this Court-led integration process. Yet, the reaction by Member 
States’ representatives was more cautious about the possibility of redrafting the Posted 
Workers Directive than a majority of the European Parliament was. Interestingly, Sweden 
was among the most reluctant Member States.  
During the whole procedure however, the Swedish Trade Unions were officially supported by 
the Swedish government, but also by 15 Member States, most of them belonging to the 
former ‘EU 15’. Latvia, Lithuania and Poland were amongst the countries which complained 
about the hindrance to the community law on free movement39. It is not surprising that some 
Member States, especially the new ones, do not feel strong incentives to protect the Nordic 
collective agreements. The reaction of the new Swedish government (elected in September 
2006) is more puzzling at first glance. Despite their open support to LO-Byggnads when they 
took over the proceedings, Swedish officials urged their partners at the Council to refrain 
from taking hasty initiatives and the Swedish Government responded with utterly discretion, 
simply asking the Commission to implement the Court’s decision smoothly40. Sweden and 
Denmark also expressed their commitment to improving the administrative mechanisms in 
order to fully implement the Posted Workers Directive41. “I welcome the constructive attitude 
of Sweden and Denmark”, Commissioner Vladimir Špidla said42. 
The relations between the Swedish authorities and the Commission improved significantly 
since 2005. Back then, the Internal Market Commissioner McGreevy openly criticized the 
Swedish labour legislation, while the social-democrat Minister of the economy Thomas 
Östros threatened to oppose the services directive if the Commission did not show more 
support to its collective agreement system during the ECJ proceedings43. The Laval dispute 
was a major issue for Nordic social-democrats, like the President of the socialist group at the 
European Parliament who feared that this case could open uncertainties about the respect of 
                                                 
36 Säger case, C-76/90 (1991) ECR I-4221, para. 12 
37 This decision is at odds with the preliminary judgement made in May 2007 by the Advocate General Paolo 
Mengozzi, which held that the collective action was proportionate. 
38 For a deeper study of the functioning of the ECJ, see Dehousse, 1998 
39 ”EU ger Vaxholmsbesked i veckan”, Dagens Nyheter, 20-05-2007 
40 One of the reasons why Sweden is reluctant to bring this issue back on the EU-agenda is certainly the 
ratification of the new treaty by the Parliament, which is scheduled in September 2008  
41 In the recent years, the Commission has increased the pressure on member States in order to improve the 
implementation of the posting directive. The Commission warned member States on several occasions that this 
widespread lack of compliance will shortly lead to infraction procedures, Communication from the Commission 
11052/07 20th of June 2007 
42 „EU-debatt efter Lavaldom hettar till”, Dagens Nyheter, 23-04-2008 
43 Carsten Jørgensen, 30-11-2005 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2005/11/feature/dk0511102f.htm 
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collective actions in general44. Swedish Unions urged the Council to amend the posting 
directive in order to secure the collective agreements in the Nordic countries45, a demand 
which has been taken over by several Swedish MPs during a public debate at the Riksdag in 
April 200846. Thereafter the Swedish MEP Jan Andersson (PSE, SE) was appointed to draft 
a report on the “challenges to collective agreement in the EU47”. The final report, which was 
adopted by the European Parliament on the 22nd of October 2008, shows a clear political 
commitment to adapt the EC legislation to the specificities of collective agreements regimes. 
The EP calls on the Commission to “prepare the necessary legislative proposals which would 
assist in preventing conflicting interpretation in the future” (recital 26)48.  
Already in June, the critical stance of the European Parliament’s Committee on Employment 
and Social Affairs 49 urged the Commission to invite MEPs to a Forum organised on the 9th of 
October 2008 in order to tackle pending questions left by the ECJ decisions. But then again, 
the Swedish government tried to cool down the debate. The ministers of France, Luxemburg 
and Sweden unanimously stated that the labour rules must be policy-driven and shall not be 
left to the ECJ. Mr Biltgen from Luxembourg and the French Minister Xavier Bertrand called 
upon the Commission to publish a communication that would clarify the scope and the aims 
of the PWD. Although he said that Sweden was not willing to give up its model of labour 
relations, the Swedish Minister Sven-Otto Littorin was again elusive about those political 
initiatives, reminding that the ratification of the Lisbon treaty would provide a sufficient legal 
basis for protecting Member States against “social dumping”. The Minister did not call on the 
Commission to launch a review of the EC legislation, but rather proposed to find a 
compromise with the ECJ50. 
As the next section will show, an investigation into Sweden’s domestic labour market politics 
could be very helpful in order to better understand the “low-profile” attitude of the Swedish 
government at EU level while defending its collective agreements model. Likewise, an 
investigation into Sweden’s internal affairs could be helpful in order to understand why the 
Laval case became for the social-democrats and the Trade Unions such a dramatized fight 
for the survival of “their” labour relations model. 
 
 
2. LAVAL IN THE NATIONAL CONTEXT: THE NOT-SO-HEALTHY LABOUR RELATIONS IN SWEDEN 
 
The intrusion of EC law sparked off a lively debate about the future of the Swedish labour 
relations (Eklund, 2008). The Laval dispute contributed to escalade distrust among social 
partners, while the government has to cope both with the combativeness of social democrats 
and with the heterogeneity of its centre-left coalition on such issues. Beyond the legal 
consequences of the Court’s decision, the Laval case is a landmark dispute because it 
unveils and increases the turmoil of the Swedish autonomous labour regulations model itself. 
It highlights the current evolutions towards increasingly controversial social and industrial 
relations that could lead to the substitution of corporatist schemes either by a state-driven 
regulation or by a deregulation of the labour market. As many Europeans are looking to 
Scandinavia as a model of harmonious balance between competitiveness and social 
progress, these domestic issues give therefore to the Laval case a disastrous symbolic 
dimension. 
 
                                                 
44 « Les syndicats frustrés par l’arrêt de la Cour sur les travailleurs détachés », www.EurActiv.com, 19-12-2007 
45 ”Lavaldomen kan tvinga LO att ändra lönepolitik”, Dagens Nyheter, 18-01-2008 
46 „Lavalmål väcker heta känslor”, Dagens Nyheter, 23-04-2008 
47 A6-0370/2008 
48 Although the final report has been slightly watered down by two amendments made by the Internal Market 
committee (recital 13 and recital 28)  
49 Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, Draft report on the application of Directive 96/7/EC on the 
posting of workers (2006/2038(INI)), Rapporteur: Elisabeth Schroedter 
50 http://www.euractiv.com/en/socialeurope/eu-states-eye-political-response-laval-court-ruling/article-176245 
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Corporatist labour relations: the fading pillar of the ‘Swedish Model’ 
 
Above all, the Court’s decision is a dramatic political and symbolic setback for the Swedish 
Trade Union LO and its ally the Social Democratic Party (SAP). Commenting on the ECJ 
decision, a person involved in both LO and the SAP said that “whatever happens now, the 
balance between employers and Unions is shifting away from us51”. 
LO and its affiliates strongly committed themselves in this dispute, pouring their prestige and 
extensive political resources (rallies, campaigns, expertise) in this fight. Despite the support 
of a large share of the public52 and Sweden’s main political party, they made several 
mistakes which indubitably benefited to the employers’ Union53. By asking Laval to comply to 
Stockholm’s region medium wage (instead of an approximate of the minimum wage), and by 
implementing a massive blockade, they had in fact little chance to convince the European 
Court that their action was both appropriate and necessary. Already in December 2004, 
Niklas Bruun, lecturer in EU-labour law was sceptical about the chances of LO-Byggnads’ 
claims to be accepted by the Court54. Politically, the Swedish Unions appeared inflexible and 
dogmatic, far from the virtuous image of Swedish Unionism abroad. Moreover, LO and the 
former social-democrat labour Minister Hans Karlsson clearly did not quite get how much 
what they genuinely saw as a legitimate fight against social dumping was actually 
understood as sheer protectionism on the other side of the Baltic Sea. For example, LO-
Byggnads did not find it necessary to cooperate from the beginning of the dispute with the 
Latvian workers’ Union, a move which would have decreased the suspicion of 
protectionism55. Byggnads made then clear that “the threat is not coming from the outside 
(…) but uncaring Swedish employers are taking advantage of the provisions for free 
movement of services, at the expense of posted workers’ rights56”, but it was probably too 
late. Business organisations and liberals, although structurally weaker, suddenly had a say in 
the public debate, as they could voice their support to the discriminated-against Latvian 
posted workers57. The Swedish employers’ confederation (Svenskt Näringsliv) provided 
lawyers and juridical assistance to the Latvian company during the entire trial. Although 
Svenskt Näringsliv’s spokesman Anders Elmér kept saying that the purpose of this action 
was not to jeopardize the Swedish labour model58, the employers’ confederation tried to take 
advantage of the decision in order to make the case that Unions were given an exorbitant 
power over industrial relations in Sweden.  
This dispute is thus likely to have further disturbing impacts on labour relations, especially as 
the social partner are going in the coming months to renegotiate the general labour 
convention ”Saltsjöbadsavtalet”, which is the cornerstone of the Swedish labour model59. The 
relations between unions and employers were already mitigated, “since the Laval case, they 
are literally freezing out”, an employers’ Unionist said60. The shrinking of Trade Unions’ 
positions in industrial relations goes along with the wane of consensual labour regulations 
between social partners and the growing distrust between social partners. The Trade Unions 
have indeed much more to lose than the employers. According to LO, the Court’s decision is 
a major risk for the corporatist system, since employers are now expected to seek 
confrontation instead of “buying out” social peace to the Unions (the term is used by LO). LO 
                                                 
51 ” Efter Lavalmålet - Regeringen kan inte gömma sig bakom EU”, LO,18-01-2008 
52  According to a recent pool, 78% of the Swedish public believes that “it must be up to Sweden and not the EU 
to organise its own labour market”, although the least one can say is that this question is far from being neutral… 
Source: Sifo, quoted by ”Säger nej till EU-inblandning”, LO, 2008-09-11 
53 „Domen påverkar svensk arbetsrätt“, Dagens Nyheter, 18-12-2007 
54 ” Osakert om om facket har rätten på sin sida”, Dagens Nyheter, 02-12-2004 
55 After having ignored the Latvian Unions, LO organised a join-meeting with its Latvian counterpart LBAS on the 
17th and 18th January 2005 in Riga in order to show its commitment to defend Latvian workers as well as its 
Swedish affiliates. 
56 ”Hotet kommer inte utifrån”, Byggnads 03-12-2007 
57 ”Bäst at lugna sig”, Dagens Nyheter 20-12-2007 
58 “Laval case indicates better Swedish labour law”, Svenskt Näringsliv, 05-07-2007 
59 „Domen påverkar svensk arbetsrätt“, Dagens Nyheter, 18-12-2007 
60 „Låsta positioner efter Lavaldom”, Dagens Nyheter, 20-12-2007 
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general secretary Hans Tilly said that he is concerned about the fact that an increasing 
number of Swedish building companies are already unwilling to comply local collective 
agreements. Indeed, while Trade Unions tend to become less influential, the employers’ 
confederation has almost entirely withdrawn from tripartite corporatist bodies. We will now 
turn to the political context which is also of critical importance in order to understand the 
effects of the ECJ judgment. 
 
 
A political strategy to crush the Unions? 
 
Before he was elected Prime Minister in September 2006, the leader of the conservative 
party Fredrik Reinfeldt called Byggnads’ action “a shame for LO” and accused the building 
Union to keep wages artificially high. His coalition partner Göran Hägglund, leader of the 
Christian-democratic and now Minister of social affairs, spoke about a “mafia”61. 
Disappointment was therefore high among Swedish liberals and the employers’ federation 
when the new appointed Prime Minister chose to follow the footsteps of his social democratic 
predecessor and gave a full support to the Unions in the Laval case. Ever since this U-turn, 
there have been many conjectures about the true intentions of the government. The adverse 
judgement for the Swedish labour model gave to this question a critical importance, as the 
government is now given the opportunity to further reform the Swedish labour model. 
The relationship between the conservatives and the Trade Unions is rather ambiguous since 
Fredrik Reinfeldt turned the Party into a “new moderate” party (Nya moderaterna). Learning 
from the 1994 electoral defeat, Reinfeldt softened his neo-liberal attacks against the Welfare 
State and promoted a “blairist” model of workfare instead. However, social-democrats and 
Trade unionists voiced their suspicion about a so-called ‘hidden agenda’ against Trade 
Unions, especially when the government increased the fees for unemployment benefits 
which made Union-membership less attractive for workers62. Subsequently, more than 
200 000 persons left the Unions in a couple of months. During the past decade, Union-
membership figures have already dropped significantly from 85% to roughly 75% of all the 
workers63. The Swedish Unions have long been able to cope with workers disaffection, 
mainly by providing pecuniary advantages and services such as unemployment insurances 
(A-kassan). This reform was thus seen by many unionists as an explicit attempt to further 
weaken their organisations. The spokesman of the white-collars Union TCO, Sture North, 
lamented on the ongoing domestic changes affecting the Unions: “Our provisions to protect 
workers are solely based on collective conventions (…) it only works if we [the Unions] are 
influential enough64”. Indeed, the Laval decision hits Swedish Unions at a time when they are 
suffering one of the most acute crises of their history. In this context, we will now try to 
investigate its consequences for the governance of labour regulations in Sweden. 
 
 
3. THE LAVAL DECISION AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO REFORM LABOUR MARKET REGULATIONS 
 
Swedish labour regulations will have to be adjusted to EC law in response to the ECJ ruling. 
But how far? Our argument is that the ambiguity of the ruling – as it is often the case – allows 
the domestic actors to make an extensive usage of Europe and to claim more changes that 
are actually made necessary by the judgement. Likewise, the absence of domestic legislative 
reaction could also be another usage of Europe by undermining the position of Trade Unions 
on the longer run. 
The Laval case opens new opportunities for those who advocate a broad reform of the labour 
market. The liberal columnist Per Dahl believes that “it is time to break Unions’ monopoly on 
                                                 
61 „Osakert om om facket har rätten på sin sida”, Dagens Nyheter, 02-12-2004 
62 ”Svenska modellen riskerar falla sönder”, LO, 2008-10-17 
63 “Laval-domen illustrerar Fackets försvagning”, Affärsvärlden, 18-12-2007 
64 ”Svart år för facket”, Dagens Nyheter, 03-01-2008 
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social relations” and sees the Laval judgment as an opportunity for Sweden to get closer to 
the “European model”65. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if the Swedish authorities will 
use the Laval ‘momentum’ in order to alter the autonomous collective agreement model and 
to introduce a sort of system shift towards either an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ deregulation, a 
‘continental’ state-led regulation of the labour market, or a ‘hybrid collective agreement 
model’ like in other Scandinavian and Nordic countries. The latter option is favoured by the 
Laval Committee which was appointed by the government and remitted its report on the 
“changes in Swedish legislation (that) need to be made as a result of the Laval judgment66”. 
Whatever decision will finally be made by the government following the case, it will not be 
neutral on the longer run for the power-balance between Trade Union and employers on the 
one hand and between social partner and the State on the other.  
 
 
Collective action under scrutiny: how to translate the EC proportionality principle into 
domestic labour regulation? 
 
LO-Byggnads lost the ECJ case against Laval because its collective action was deemed 
disproportionate with regard to its objective of protecting the workers. Beyond this particular 
case, Isabell Olsson pointed out the differences between the EC principle of proportionality 
and the customary “assessments of proportionality” as driven by the Swedish Courts 
(Olsson, 2007). The transposition of the EC principle of proportionality into the Swedish 
labour relations poses a threat to the autonomous collective agreement system. As Brian 
Bercusson pointed it, “it’s in the very nature of negotiations that both parties set demands at 
their highest and through negotiation over time seek a compromise […] At what stage of this 
process and against what criteria is the test of proportionality to be applied?” (Bercusson, 
2007). The Laval case could thus open new opportunities for those who were dissatisfied 
with the customary way to assess the proportionality of collective agreements. 
The employers’ confederation Svenskt Näringsliv has for a long time called on governments 
to limit the scope of collective actions, and especially the so-called “secondary” or 
“sympathy” actions (sympatiåtgärder) 67, which means blockades and strikes implemented by 
other Trade Unions or workers in order to make a specific action more efficient (art. 41 MBL). 
Sympathy actions are most of the time implemented by LO-affiliates, as it was the case with 
the electricians’ Union helping Byggnads to blockade Laval although it was not part of the 
dispute in the first place. Already in 2005, before the ruling of the case, the employers’ 
confederation Svenskt Näringsliv released a report ”Den Svenska modellen har kantrat” (‘the 
Swedish model changed direction’) which listed seven measures in order to limit to 
possibilities for Unions to implement an industrial action68. By chance, one of the propositions 
deals with the implementation of a “proportionality rule” with would control the effects of a 
collective action on social partners and third persons. Liberals and conservative tried to 
change to labour regulations when they came to office. The labour market Commission 
(Arbetmarknadsutkottet) recently released a report on the introduction of an operative 
”principle of proportionality” which would be able to balance the objectives of collective 
actions and their actual effects on the economy69. Any attempt to introduce a more restrictive 
“principle of proportionality” in the Labour law has been unsuccessful so far70. Beyond the 
question of proportionality, let us turn to the practical reforms of the Swedish labour 
legislation that could be implemented in response to the Laval judgement and to their 
possible consequences for the future of the collective agreement model.  
 
                                                 
65 ”Domen i Vaxholmsfallet viktig, tydlig, nyanserad och avgörande”, Barometern.se, 08-01-2008 
66 SOU 2008:123 
67 ”Svenska modellen riskerar falla sönder”, LO, 2008-10-17 
68 Svenskt Näringsliv, ”Den Svenska Modellen har kantrat. Konfikt Sexton exempel på obalansen på den svenska 
arbetsmarknaden och sju förslag på vad som kan göras för att återfå balansen”, April 2005 
69 Arbetsmarknedsutskottet betänkande 2006/07:AU9 
70 e.g. the public report SOU:141 
A. Davesne – The Laval Case and the Future of Labour Relations in Sweden 
Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po – n° 01/2009 15
To act or not to act? The Swedish labour governance at the crossroads 
 
Only a few collective conventions are directly put under pressure by the ECJ decision, 
namely those dealing with posted workers. Sweden will now have to grant a better access of 
posted workers to its collective agreement system. It is now unanimously acknowledged that 
the Swedish collective convention system is lacking transparency, especially for foreign 
companies. As an example, the local agreement that Laval refused to sign was a 170 pages 
long document. Moreover, the “Lex Britannia” amendment will have to be abrogated, as it is 
too obviously discriminatory against foreign employers. This is enough to have potential 
disruptive effects on the whole system of labour market regulation. The Trade Unions 
demand sufficient guarantees about the appliance of collective agreements to foreign 
companies. The key question is now whether the authorities will be able to control on a non 
discriminatory basis the posting of foreign workers without affecting the autonomy of social 
partners. 
According to Sture North, the compliance to the Laval decision is an interesting issue 
because it forces the government to take a clear stance and to decide whether or not it is 
willing to support the corporatist system: “If it is what the government wants, so can we easily 
deal with [the ECJ decision]71”. After having stated that the government is not going to take 
any decision soon, the Minister of labour Sven Otto Littorin faced the criticisms from unionists 
and social-democrats who urged the Swedish government to launch a legislative process in 
order to cope with the decision. According to LO’s Wanja Lundby-Wedin and Erland 
Olauson, “if the governments hides behind the ECJ, it would lead to a deregulation of the 
labour market and so will the opposition between workers an employers increase 
significantly72”. Sven Otto Littorin replied that “something has to be done with the Lex 
Britannia amendment. But it is also true that this could not only be solved by the government. 
Social partners will have to take into account the Court’s decision and take initiatives in order 
to adapt the Swedish model73”. 
Since the ECJ judgement in December 2007, the labour minister changed slightly his attitude 
and promises that the whole Swedish law on the posting of workers will be revised, and not 
only the Lex Britannia amendment. But he is still very quiet on the type of changes that are 
needed74. A Laval committee (Lavalutredningen) has been set up in on the 10th of April 2008, 
with the assignment to review the different options that could bring the Swedish labour 
relations in line with EC law. The blueprint that has been given to the Laval Committee is the 
following: “the Swedish model has to be adapted as much as possible to the posting of 
foreign workers. The rapporteur will review the laws which may have to be changed and take 
a special look at whether the so called Lex Britannia shall be revised, abrogated or replaced. 
He will also assess the possibility to include collective agreements in the law on the posting 
of workers75”.  
 
 
The Laval Committee and the three ways out 
 
How to bring the Swedish labour law system in line with Posting of Workers Directive? This 
could be done either by creating statutory rules for minimum rates of pay or by setting up a 
system for declaring collective agreements to be universally applicable, both methods that 
are validated by the Directive. 
The employers’ federation Svenskt Näringsliv is in favour of the introduction of a legal 
minimum wage76, while Trade Unions made clear that they would strongly oppose any kind 
of minimum wage: “They [the employers’] will have to choose a line. They cannot say that 
                                                 
71 ”Lavaldomen kan tvinga LO att ändra lönepolitik”, Dagens Nyheter, 18-01-2008 
72 Interpellation, 2007/08:483 Utredningen med anledning av Lavalmålet 
73 ” Lagändring utreds efter Lavaldomen”, Dagens Nyheter, 28-01-2008 
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76 ”Vaxholmfallet kan kräva en ny facklig strategi“, Europaportalen, 15-02-2007 
A. Davesne – The Laval Case and the Future of Labour Relations in Sweden 
Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po – n° 01/2009 16
they want to keep the Swedish model, and in the same time propose a minimum wage77”. 
Labour law experts are almost as divided as social partners on the minimum wage issue. 
Some believe that minimal wage provisions could be integrated to the Swedish corporatist 
system without endangering the collective negotiations78. The labour market researcher 
Svante Nycander does not share this optimistic stance. According to him, the introduction of 
minimal wage standards would necessarily recast the corporatist system into a state-
regulated labour market as it is the case in France or a court-driven system as in Britain79. 
Referring to the famous “free rider” theory, Nils Karlsson and Henrik Lindberg fear that an 
increased input of politicians on wage regulations would accelerate the decline of Unions’ 
membership and thus lead to the destruction of th 80e social consensus . 
                                                
A second option for reshaping the Swedish labour law in accordance with EC community law 
would be, following other Nordic countries, to set by law an automatic application system of 
collective conventions81. This system seems to be the nearest to the current Swedish model 
and would thus allow a minimal change in order to comply with the ECJ decision. The former 
Prime Minister Göran Persson already referred to this option as a possible “fall-back 
strategy” if the Swedish system was turned down by the Court. Whereas a legal automatic 
extension of collective agreements is expected to be less endangering the labour relations, 
some Trade Union leaders and social scientists claim with Bo Rönngren that “both 
alternatives are going to undermine the Unions’ influence on the labour market”82. They 
believe that workers would not feel the urge to be member of a Trade Union in order to 
benefit from the general applicable collective agreement system. Taking France as an 
example, Svante Nycander argues that this cognitive shift would lead to a “free rider” 
mechanism too. As the Trade Unions’ membership will drop, their political stance will 
necessarily become less consensual, and Unions will tend to only defend “insiders” interests, 
as it is allegedly the case in France83. 
The Laval Committee’s rapporteur Claes Stråth finally presented its propositions on the 12th 
of December 2008. Following its Terms of Reference, the Laval Committee made clear that 
“An introduction of any of these systems, that is to say statutory minimum rates of pay or 
declaring collective agreements to be universally applicable, would consequently entail a 
major intrusion into the Swedish labour market model. (…) these solutions should be avoided 
if it is possible according to Community law to implement a less extensive solution as regards 
the autonomy of the parties in the labour market84”. A third method, the Committee argued, is 
thus to reinforce the responsibility of social partners in the regulation of social relations. The 
Lew Britannia amendment shall be abrogated and the principle of mutual recognition must 
apply fully to foreign collective agreements. The law on labour regulation (MLB) would be left 
almost unchanged. Only the items that are not included in the “hard core” of the Posting of 
Workers Directive (e.g. night shifts, working hours, breaks…) would be withdrawn from the 
collective agreements applicable to foreign companies (and thus could not lead to a 
collective action in case of non compliance). However, social partners will continue to be set 
up and enforce minimum rates of pay and other minimum conditions within the ‘hard core’ 
that are to be applied for a particular category of posted workers according to the central and 
nationwide collective agreement applicable to the sector. Foreign employers would thus be 
asked to comply with the Swedish collective agreements, while Swedish Trade Unions would 
have to set more predictable and transparent rules on wage-setting. In order to help them in 
this task, the Committee’s proposes to reinforce the role of the “liaison office”, the Swedish 
 
77 "Arbetsgivare vill att minimilöner synas”, LO, 2008-09-24 
78 ”Utländska företag måste få veta kraven”, Dagens Nyheter, 18-12-2007 
79 ”Ny lag om kollektivavtal stryper facket i egen snara”, Dagens Nyheter, 20-12-2007 
80 ”Den svenska modellen kan knäckas av EG-rätt”, Dagens Nyheter, 17-10-2008 
81 Ronnie Eklund, law lecturer at Stockholm University, points out at the Finnish model where all the sector 
agreements are binding to all the employers. Another option would be the Danish one, according to TCO’s expert 
Ingemar Hamskär: “the law is made such as the best conditions always apply to the employees”.  
82 Bo Rönngren, “Utstationeringsdirektivet – Vaxholmsfallet i Sverige”, LO, Förklarande PM till EFS styrkommitté 
den 20050210 
83 ”Ny lag om kollektivavtal stryper facket i egen snara”, Dagens Nyheter 20-12-2007 
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Work Environment Authority, which “aims to simplify matters, both for foreign employers and 
workers, regarding the obtaining of information about the conditions and requirements 
applicable upon a posting to Sweden85”. 
The Laval Committee clearly chose to support the autonomy of Trade Unions. But this 
proposal provides a thin guarantee to prevent another ECJ reference. It mainly builds upon 
the responsibility of the Swedish Trade Unions and could thus be a two-edged sword for the 
autonomous labour system if they do not fulfil the need for transparency and openness. We 
pointed out above that the Laval case did not arise at random, but in a very specific context 
of increasingly conflicting labour relations. One can thus argue that trust amongst labour 
market organisations can hardly be decided from above. The tensions that caused the Laval 
case are thus likely to arise again soon or later unless/until the Directive on Posted Workers 
is redrafted. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Although the Laval case is most likely to trigger a formally limited reform of the Swedish 
labour regulations in the short run, we pointed out that it is a factor of toughening the 
relations between the State, the employers and the Unions. Following Ferrera and Rhodes’ 
analysis on the Welfare State (Ferrera and Rhodes, 2000), we argue that a “recasting” of 
industrial relations is occurring in Sweden, combining European constraints and incentives 
as well as domestically generated social and political changes. Jonas Malmberg expressed 
this idea with dramatic words during his hearing at the European Parliament: “In the shadow 
of the internal market a territorial struggle is in progress over where labour law ends and 
economic rules take over86”. Indeed, this article pointed out the juridical constraints, the 
political opportunities and the mechanisms of interaction which explain why the trade-off 
between EC economic and social rights at EU level directly affects the domestic balance 
between the State, the employers and the Trade Unions. 
The main result of this investigation is that the Laval judgment created new incentive for 
reforming labour regulations in Sweden, firstly because it accelerates the decline of Trade 
Unions which are the central actors of autonomous collective agreements. Secondly, it 
creates an immediate opportunity to change the Swedish labour regulations, beyond the 
legal adjustments that the judgement requires. The ambiguity of the ruling and the complexity 
of the Swedish labour model opened a wide range of political choices for the government. If 
the labour Minister follows the final report of the Laval committee that he commissioned in 
April 2008, the government is rather unlikely to implement a system shift either towards the 
continental or the Anglo-Saxon models. The usages of the Laval case by social actors and 
by the government are a decisive factor for the future of the Swedish labour model. We 
highlighted at least two strong patterns so far: the employers and the government made a 
spectacular political breakthrough in promoting a stronger legal supervision over labour 
relations, while Trade Unions and social-democrats seem to be trapped in a dilemma. On the 
one hand, a more active State intervention would put Trade Unions at risk of loosing their 
role as a central institution of labour regulations. But, on the other hand, there is a risk of 
juridical uncertainty and potential social dumping if the Swedish labour law is not thoroughly 
revised. 
To the eyes of many European observers, the Laval case highlighted the inner troubles of 
the Swedish labour model and the need for a more coherent EU social legislation. But will 
Nordic Trade Unions and social-democratic parties become less reluctant to the idea of a 
continental-inspired “social Europe” featuring a pan-European minimum wage87? There is 
simply so far no evidence that the Laval case had any impact in that respect. 
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87 See “L’Europe social est de retour” by Marc Clément, http://www.telos-
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